Privacy and Conformity: Rethinking “The Right Most Valued by Civilized Men” by Gallagher, Susan E.
Touro Law Review 
Volume 33 




Privacy and Conformity: Rethinking “The Right Most Valued by 
Civilized Men” 
Susan E. Gallagher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Judges Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gallagher, Susan E. (2017) "Privacy and Conformity: Rethinking “The Right Most Valued by Civilized Men”," 
Touro Law Review: Vol. 33 : No. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
 
159 
PRIVACY AND CONFORMITY: RETHINKING “THE RIGHT 
MOST VALUED BY CIVILIZED MEN” 
  
Susan E. Gallagher* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 1890, soon after The Right to Privacy,1 which 
Louis D. Brandeis penned with his former law partner Samuel D. 
Warren, appeared in the Harvard Law Review, Brandeis wrote to his 
fiancée, Alice Goldmark: 
      Of course you are right about Privacy and Public 
Opinion.  All law is a dead letter without public 
opinion behind it.  But law and public opinion 
interact―and they are both capable of being made. . . . 
Our hope is to make people see that invasions of 
privacy are not necessarily borne―and then make 
them ashamed of the pleasure they take in subjecting 
themselves to such invasions. . . .  
      The most perhaps that we can accomplish is to 
start a backfire, as the woodsmen or the prairie men 
do.2   
Given Brandeis’ comments on privacy and public opinion, it 
seems safe to surmise that Goldmark had remarked on the public’s 
seemingly insatiable appetite for gossip; implying, perhaps, that a 
relatively cerebral article such as The Right to Privacy could not 
 
*Susan E. Gallagher is an associate professor of political science at the University of 
Massachusetts Lowell. 
1 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890).  
2 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS OF LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS 97 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971) [hereinafter 1 LETTERS]. 
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make much headway against the ever more intrusive and powerful 
forces of yellow journalism.  Brandeis’ reply is instructive, in part 
because his notion of setting a backfire indicates that he had no idea 
that the essay would transform American legal history,3 but also 
because it highlights his hope that The Right to Privacy might 
dampen popular demand for salacious news by filling its readers with 
shame.4 
In attempting to turn privacy invaders to objects of public 
scorn, Brandeis took a well-worn path in late nineteenth-century 
social discourse.  This approach had been adopted most famously in 
the 1870s by abolitionist minister Henry Ward Beecher,5 who became 
the focus of an unprecedented torrent of national news coverage after 
he was accused of having had an affair with Elizabeth Tilton, a 
member of his Brooklyn congregation.6  Brandeis and Warren’s 
grievances against the scandal can be traced back to Beecher’s 
repeated condemnations of tellers of family secrets,7 which 
illuminates The Right to Privacy on several fronts.  In the first place, 
it explains why the article was presented and received as a long-
awaited solution to a widely recognized problem rather than, as more 
recent scholars have viewed it, a novel chapter in American law.8  To 
 
3 Just days after the essay was published, To-Day, a popular periodical, called readers’ 
attention to The Right to Privacy and conveyed to its readers that: 
A remarkable article, with the above title, by Messrs. S. D. Warren and 
L. D. Brandeis, appears in the Harvard Law Review for December.  The 
subject is of such interest and importance that we attempt a summary, 
giving as far as possible the exact words of the authors; but this will be a 
poor substitute for the original, which is enriched by a wealth of citations 
and illustrations rare in a magazine article. 
The Right to Privacy, TO-DAY, Dec. 25, 1890 at 91; see also Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in 
Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 
(1966) (criticizing but also characterizing The Right to Privacy as the “most influential law 
review article of all”); see also Hillary Rodham Clinton, Address on Privacy Policy at the 
2006 Democratic National Convention (June 16, 2006) (video available on the American 
Constitution Society for Law and Policy website) (recalling her law school days and sharing, 
“The first thing we learned about the right to privacy was that it sprung from the mind of 
Louis Brandeis, beginning with a law review article in the 1890s”).  
4 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 2, at 97. 
5 See generally J.E.P. DOYLE, PLYMOUTH CHURCH AND ITS PASTOR OR HENRY WARD BEECHER 
AND HIS ACCUSERS (Hartford, The Park Publ’g Co. 1874).  
6 Id. at 46-77. 
7 Thomas Sproull & John W. Sproull, Tittle Tattle, 7 THE REFORMED PRESBYTERIAN AND 
COVENANTER 279, 279–80 (1869).  
8 See, e.g., Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3 
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be sure, Brandeis and Warren addressed innovations in 
communications technology in a way that would not have made sense 
twenty years earlier.9  At the same time, however, their critique of 
newspaper reporting on sexual crimes and indiscretions affirmed a 
conviction that Beecher and other social observers had voiced for 
decades, which was that the harm inflicted by the public revelation of 
sexual misconduct was so great that information about such matters 
should always be suppressed.10  
The Right to Privacy also harkens back to the Beecher scandal 
in its connection with, what twentieth-century radicals derided as 
Comstockery,11 a decades-long campaign to cleanse American society 
of any visible sign of sexual activity.12  The movement drew its name 
and most of its energy from Anthony Comstock, who launched his 
long career as America’s censor-in-chief by hounding Victoria 
Woodhull, the notorious proponent of free love who set Beecher’s 
travails in motion by publicly accusing him of adultery.13  In a highly 
ironic twist in this paradoxical history, Woodhull defended her 
revelation of Beecher’s personal affairs as a major step toward the 
realization of a complete and authentic right to privacy, a world in 
which both men and women would be free to love whomever they 
might choose without fear of intervention by any external authority.14 
The stark contrast between Woodhull’s expansive vision of 
personal autonomy and Brandeis and Warren’s preoccupation with 
the protection of men’s public image allows us to understand more 
clearly the tangled evolution of ideas about privacy since the turn of 
the nineteenth-century.  Here, after exploring how the Beecher 
scandal inspired a perceived need to silence public discussion of 
sexual misconduct, then considering how this repressive impulse 
 
(1979). 
9 Id. at 8. 
10 Id. at 8-11. 
11 John R. Corvell, Comstockery, 1 MOTHER EARTH 30, 30 (1906). 
12 Id. at 30-33. 
13 See, e.g., AMANDA FRISKEN, VICTORIA WOODHULL’S SEXUAL REVOLUTION: POLITICAL 
THEATER AND THE POPULAR PRESS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 14 (2004) [hereinafter 
FRISKEN, SEXUAL REVOULTION] (providing insight into social and cultural forces that 
combined to enable Woodhull to capitalize on her role in the Beecher scandal).  
14 Author Janna Malamud Smith was, I think, the first commentator to recognize Woodhull’s 
conception of the right to privacy as a significant aspect of her contribution to American 
social thought.  See JANNA MALAMUD SMITH, PRIVATE MATTERS: IN DEFENSE OF THE 
PERSONAL LIFE Ch. 4 (Seal Press eds., 1997).  
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shaped Brandeis and Warren’s critique of the overly “enterprising 
press,” I will end with a brief reflection on the impact of The Right to 
Privacy on prevailing approaches to the public/private dichotomy in 
American society.15 
II. PRIVACY AND THE BEECHER-TILTON SCANDAL 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, as 
improvements in communications technology made it harder to 
control the dissemination of personal information, ministers, advice-
book writers, and other dispensers of moral instruction increasingly 
identified privacy as a sacred right.  In 1866, for instance, Henry 
Ward Beecher, one of the most popular preachers of the age, 
proclaimed from his Brooklyn pulpit, “The private rights of a public 
man should be guarded as sacredly as the altar of a temple.”16  And 
while all men should be required to practice “good morals,” Beecher 
sermonized, “There ought to be but one key to a man’s privacy, and 
that in his own hands; but the devil has given everybody a key to it, 
and everybody goes in and out, and filches whatever he pleases.”17 
A commentary on “Tale-bearers,” usually attributed to 
Beecher, which was repeatedly reprinted during the late 1860s and 
early 1870s, illustrates how respect for the right to privacy rose to the 
top of the lists of virtues that moralists liked to recite to their fellow 
citizens: 
TITTLE TATTLE. 
      Henry Ward Beecher has said many good things, 
but nothing that commends itself more to all honorable 
people than the following: 
      The disposition to pry into the privacy of domestic 
life is, unfortunately, very common, and is always 
dishonorable.  The appetite for such knowledge is to 
be regarded as morbid, and the indulgence of it 
disgraceful.  A family has a sacred right to 
privacy. . . . To betray the secrets of the household is 
 
15 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 206. 
16 HENRY WARD BEECHER & GEORGE DAVID EVANS, ONE THOUSAND GEMS 79 (London, 
Hodder & Stoughton eds., 1872).  
17 Id. 
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not only an odious immorality, but it is a sin and a 
shame to be on good terms with those who are known 
to commit such outrages.  They put themselves out of 
the pale of decent society.  They should be treated as 
moral outlaws.18 
Beecher’s condemnation of those who invade domestic 
privacy as moral outlaws was typical of the period, but it is ironic 
that these remarks first appeared in 1869, two years before his name 
became synonymous with scandal in what was breathlessly described 
as “The Greatest Social Drama of Modern Times.”19  Victoria 
Woodhull, who was dubbed Mrs. Satan20 after she went about the 
country lecturing on the joy of free love, set the stage for the scandal 
by committing precisely the sin that Beecher had so severely 
censured.21  In a letter to the New York Times, she castigated critics of 
her free love philosophy for their hypocrisy, and then she alluded to 
“a public teacher of eminence, who lives in concubinage with the 
wife of another public teacher of almost equal eminence.”22  Readers 
who had heard the persistent rumors of irregularities at Beecher’s 
church might have guessed the identity of Woodhull’s target.23  J.E.P. 
Doyle, who compiled an exhaustive account of the saga in 1874, 
wrote, “Nobody, however, placed much reliance on the ‘slanders,’ as 
they were very generally designated, until in the issue of Woodhull 
and Claflin’s Weekly, of November 2d, 1872, there were explicit and 
detailed charges made.”24 
Woodhull had long surpassed the bounds of social propriety 
when she ignited the first national media frenzy after publicly 
accusing Beecher of having engaged in an adulterous affair with 
Elizabeth Tilton, the wife of his long-time friend, Theodore Tilton.25  
 
18 Sproull & Sproull, supra note 7, at 279. 
19 LEON OLIVER, THE GREAT SENSATION: A FULL, COMPLETE AND RELIABLE HISTORY OF THE 
BEECHER-TILTON-WOODHULL SCANDAL 165 (Beverly Co., Publishers eds., 1873). 




22 Victoria Woodhull, Letter to the Editor, Mrs. Woodhull and Her Critics, N.Y. TIMES, May 
20, 1871, at 5. 
23 DOYLE, supra note 5, at 13.  
24 DOYLE, supra note 5, at 13. 
25 See CHARLES SUTTON, The New York Tombs; its Secrets and its Mysteries 511-12 (James 
B. Mix & Samuel Anderson Mackeever eds., San Francisco, A. Roman & Co. 1874); see 
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Soon after Woodhull and her sister, Tennessee (also known as Tennie 
C.) Claflin, arrived in New York City in 1868, they were widely 
derided in the press when, with the help of Cornelius Vanderbilt, they 
became the first women to establish and run a stock brokerage 
company.26  Two years later, the sisters created another sensation 
when they used the proceeds of their business to fund Woodhull & 
Claflin’s Weekly, a platform for the promotion of socialism, woman 
suffrage, spiritualism, free love, and, in 1872, Woodhull’s run for the 
presidency of the United States.27  
Seemingly incapable of practicing the silence and secrecy that 
Beecher upheld as essential, Woodhull avidly pursued her 
presidential ambitions even though her background and beliefs, along 
with her age and her gender, deprived her of any chance of success.28  
Having grown up in poverty, she married Canning Woodhull, an 
abusive alcoholic, in 1853, at the age of fourteen.29  During and after 
her first marriage, Victoria Woodhull supported herself by telling 
fortunes and dispensing magnetic healing with her sister.30  She 
married Colonel James Blood, a fellow spiritualist, in St. Louis in 
1866, after her first husband became incapable of providing for her 
and their two children.31  The misery of her first marriage did not stop 
her from taking Canning Woodhull into her Brooklyn home when his 
addictions overwhelmed him, an arrangement that shocked New 
York society, but apparently did not bother Blood.32 
Woodhull’s contemporaries, like historians to follow, 
generally assumed that she had divulged what she knew about 
Beecher’s affair with Elizabeth Tilton as a way to lash out at critics 
of her free love philosophy.33  Whatever role resentment may have 
 
also Amanda Frisken, Sex in Politics: Victoria Woodhull as an American Public Woman, 
1870-1876, 12 J. OF WOMEN’S HIST. 89, 91-92 (2000) [hereinafter Frisken, Sex in Politics]. 
26 SUTTON, supra note 25, at 506-08.  
27 Frisken, Sex in Politics, supra note 25, at 91, 93-95, 101. 
28 Frisken, Sex in Politics, supra note 25, at 89-90, 96, 100-03. 
29 FRISKEN, SEXUAL REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 7; IRVING WALLACE, THE SQUARE PEGS: 
SOME AMERICANS WHO DARED TO BE DIFFERENT 108 (1957). 
30 FRISKEN, SEXUAL REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 8; Nicole Evelina, Victoria Woodhull’s 
First Husband: Canning Woodhull, NICOLE EVELINA: STORIES OF STRONG WOMEN FROM HIST. 
& TODAY (May 18, 2015), https://nicoleevelina.com/2015/05/18/victoria-woodhulls-first-
husband-canning-woodhull/. 
31 FRISKEN, SEXUAL REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 8; Evelina, supra note 30. 
32 FRISKEN, SEXUAL REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 7-8; WALLACE, supra note 29, at 120-21; 
Evelina, supra note 30. 
33 OLIVER, supra note 19, at 145; Victoria Woodhull – Speaking out for Free Love; Going to 
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played in her motives, she framed the exposure as a revolutionary 
step towards the realization of an absolute right to privacy.34  “I 
believe,” she declared in a carefully crafted interview that was 
published in her newspaper, “in the right of privacy, in the sanctity of 
individual relations.  It is nobody’s business but their own, in the 
absolute view, what Mr. Beecher and Mrs. Tilton have done, or may 
choose at any time to do, as between themselves.”35  Woodhull was, 
nevertheless, morally obliged to reveal the affair because she could 
find no other way to force the minister to shake off his shroud of 
sexual secrecy and join her in spreading the “gospel of freedom”: 
[I]t is the paradox of my position that, believing in the 
right of privacy and in the perfect right of Mr. 
BEECHER socially, morally and divinely to have 
sought the embraces of Mrs. TILTON or of any other 
woman or women whom he loved and who loved 
him . . . I still invade the most secret and sacred affairs 
of his life, and drag them to the light . . . . the leaders 
of progress are . . . storming the last fortress of bigotry 
and error.  Somebody must be hurled forward into the 
gap.  I have the power, I think, to compel MR. 
BEECHER to . . . do the duty for humanity from which 
he shrinks.36 
According to Woodhull, personal relations ought to be 
exempt from public disclosure because we all should be free to love 
whomever we are divinely inspired to choose without regard to social 
strictures or legal contracts and not, as Beecher would have it, 
because such revelations ruin reputations.37  So long as emblematic 
figures such as Beecher allowed themselves to be trammeled by 
social convention, she argued, the “sacred interests of humanity” in 
the free communication of love would be constantly undermined.38  
From this premise, she justified her violation of Beecher’s privacy as 
a short-term skirmish in the long-term war to establish individual 
 
Jail, VIRAL HIST. (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.viralhistory.com/ (enter “Victoria Woodhull” 
into the search box). 
34 OLIVER, supra note 19, at 144-45. 
35 OLIVER, supra note 19, at 144. 
36 DOYLE, supra note 5, at 39. 
37 DOYLE, supra note 5, at 14-15. 
38 DOYLE, supra note 5, at 15. 
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sovereignty as the governing principle of both public and private 
life.39 
I hold that the so-called morality of society is a 
complicated mass of sheer impertinence and a scandal 
on the civilization of this advanced century, that the 
system of social espionage under which we live is 
damnable, and that the very first axiom of a true 
morality, is for people to mind their own business, and 
learn to respect, religiously, the social freedom and the 
sacred social privacy of all others.40 
Although Woodhull claimed “legitimate generalship” in her call for 
Beecher to take an honest stand against “social espionage,” he 
declined the challenge.41  Instead, throughout the “Beecher-Tilton 
War,” as he was exonerated by a board of inquiry at Plymouth 
Church, acquitted of “criminal intimacy” in a Brooklyn court, and 
subjected to an unprecedented torrent of national reporting on his 
formerly private life, he steadfastly denied the charges.42  
Meanwhile, Woodhull was repeatedly arrested at the behest of 
Anthony Comstock, the hyper-vigilant head of the New York Society 
for the Suppression of Vice.43  In the midst of the Beecher scandal, as 
he was pursuing Woodhull on obscenity charges based in part on her 
exposure of Beecher in her paper, Comstock found time to travel to 
Washington, where he successfully lobbied Congress to pass what 
became known as the Comstock Law, an “Act for the Suppression of 
Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of 
Immoral Use.”44  His battle with Woodhull was subsequently 
eclipsed by his campaign to prevent Margaret Sanger from 
 
39 DOYLE, supra note 5, at 39. 
40 DOYLE, supra note 5, at 39 (emphasis omitted).  
41 DOYLE, supra note 5, at 38-39. 
42 See Kathleen Hall, The Henry Ward Beecher Adultery Trial (1874): Selected Links, U. OF 
MO.-KAN. CITY, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Beecherlinks.html (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2017); Lindsay Turley, The Beecher-Tilton Affair, MCNY BLOG: NEW YORK 
STORIES (Oct. 23, 2012), https://blog.mcny.org/2012/10/23/the-beecher-tilton-affair/; see 
generally J. H. PAXON, THE GREAT BROOKLYN ROMANCE. ALL THE DOCUMENTS IN THE 
FAMOUS BEECHER-TILTON CASE, UNABRIDGED (1874).  
43 Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz, Victoria Woodhull, Anthony Comstock, and Conflict over Sex 
in the United States in the 1870s, 87 THE J. OF AM. HIST. 403, 419 (2000). 
44 Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of 
Immoral Use, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 599 (1873). 
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circulating information and materials related to birth control.45  
However, he started his long career by crusading against publications 
such as Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly for what Brandeis and 
Warren would later denounce as “overstepping in every direction the 
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.”46  From Comstock’s 
standpoint, Woodhull’s revelations about Beecher threatened social 
order because they portended a world in which, to quote The Right to 
Privacy, 
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the 
vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with 
industry as well as effrontery.  To satisfy a prurient 
taste the details of sexual relations are spread 
broadcast in the columns of the daily papers.  To 
occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled 
with idle gossip, which can only be procured by 
intrusion upon the domestic circle.47 
Although Woodhull and Claflin ultimately beat the charges, 
her portrait of herself and her sister as martyrs to the march of social 
progress failed to attract much public sympathy.48  Indeed, her brazen 
rejection of social convention helped to assure the ascendancy of 
Beecher’s notion of privacy, with its emphasis on secrecy, over her 
own conception of privacy as an assertion of individual freedom.49  
Fittingly, in 1871, long before the Beecher scandal had exhausted the 
public’s attention, a member of his congregation published an 
expanded version of the minister’s earlier remarks on the “sacred 
right to privacy.”50  Tellers of family secrets, Beecher proclaimed, 
ought to be not merely shunned, but physically attacked: 
      These hungry-eyed wretches who sit in the 
unsuspicious circle of parents and children . . . spying 
 
45 See, e.g., Margaret H. Sanger, Comstockery in America, 16 INT’L SOCIALIST REV. 46, 46-
49 (1915). 
46 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.  
47 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.  
48 Carol Felsenthal, The Strange Tale of the First Woman to Run for President, POLITICO 
MAGAZINE (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/victoria-
woodhull-first-woman-presidential-candidate-116828.  
49 FRISKEN, SEXUAL REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 6.  
50 ALFRED I. HOLMES, LIFE THOUGHTS FROM PULPITS AND FROM POETS 218 (Brooklyn, Rev. 
A. I. Holmes eds., 1871). 
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their weaknesses, misinterpreting the innocent liberties 
of the household, and then run from house to house 
with their shameless news, are worse than poisoners of 
wells or burners of houses. . . . If one opens his mouth 
to tell you such things, with all your might smite him 
in the face! . . . Tale-bearers have no rights. . . . Hunt, 
harry, and hound them out of good society.51 
Beecher’s admonitions illustrate the unexamined assumptions 
made by privacy advocates until well into the twentieth century.  
Here, as usual in the wake of the Beecher scandal, the focus of 
discussion was not freedom of conscience or action, but the evil of 
public revelation.52  Echoing legal opinion in his era, Beecher 
maintained without explanation that the disclosure of personal 
misconduct must be, at least in most cases, somehow more 
malevolent than the original misdeed.53  From this vantage point, it 
makes sense that whatever Beecher may have done or lied about 
doing, he suffered no formal penalty while Woodhull and her sister 
landed in jail.54  However much he and other moralists may have 
exalted individual integrity in other contexts, in regard, for instance, 
to promoting resistance to slavery, they argued that every man had a 
perfect right to preserve his public image even if he had engaged in 
behavior that he publicly condemned.55 
The gulf between these two perspectives allows us to 
understand more fully how the public/private dichotomy evolved in 
later decades.  Whatever uncertainty remains about Woodhull’s 
motives, there is no doubt about her contempt for the “system of 
social espionage.”56 In her view, maintaining a façade of normalcy 
merely to seem virtuous in the eyes of society robbed the right to 
 
51 Id. at 219-20. 
52 State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 459 (1868) (“We will not inflict upon society the greater 
evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling 
violence.”) (overruling recognized by Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Services Corp., 515 
S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1999)). 
53 Id. at 454 (“The courts have been loath to take cognizance of trivial complaints arising out 
of the domestic relations . . . Not because those relations are not subject to the law, but 
because the evil of publicity would be greater than the evil involved in the trifles complained 
of; and because they ought to be left to family government.”)  
54 See Turley, supra note 42. 
55 See Turley, supra note 42. 
56 Victoria C. Woodhull, The Beecher-Tilton Scandal Case.  The Detailed Statement of the 
Whole Matter By Mrs. Woodhull, WOODHULL & CLAFLIN’S WEEKLY, Nov. 2, 1872, at 12.  
10
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privacy of all meaning.57  “Respectability!,” she declared, “It is the 
most horrid word in the language, so long as a man or woman has a 
particle of it left, their ability for usefulness is dwarfed if not wholly 
eliminated.”58  For Beecher, in contrast, the essential purpose of the 
right to privacy was to shield the domestic realm from intrusion so 
that men could preserve their reputations irrespective of their actual 
conduct and thereby enjoy inner peace.59  Beecher was never 
formally found guilty, but in the aftermath of the scandal, he came to 
symbolize hypocrisy as he was constantly caricatured in newspaper 
illustrations and otherwise ridiculed in the press.60  
III. PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 
A decade after the Beecher affair had faded from the 
headlines, when Brandeis and Warren joined the campaign to protect 
the right to privacy, they followed the minister’s lead.61  In keeping 
with the explosive growth of the newspaper industry at the end of the 
nineteenth century, The Right to Privacy updated Beecher’s focus on 
tale-bearers by excoriating journalists for having turned 
neighborhood gossip into a national pastime.62  Likewise, responding 
to the rapid development of the telegraph, the telephone, and 
photography, Brandeis and Warren stressed that the domestic realm 
had become increasingly vulnerable to intrusion, making it even more 
imperative to introduce legislation that would shore up the 
boundaries between public and private life.63 
      Recent inventions and business methods call 
attention to the next step which must be taken for the 
protection of the person, and for securing to the, 
individual what Judge Cooley calls the right “to be let 
alone.”  Instantaneous photographs and newspaper 
 
57 OLIVER, supra note 19, at 144. 
58 OLIVER, supra note 19, at 69. 
59 OLIVER, supra note 19, at 69. 
60 See, e.g., JAMES E. COOK, TESTIMONY IN THE GREAT BEECHER-TILTON SCANDAL CASE 
ILLUSTRATED (photo. reprt. 1875), https://www.loc.gov/item/99400533/; see also Laura 
Hanft Korobkin, The Maintenance of Mutual Confidence: Sentimental Strategies at the 
Adultery Trial of Henry Ward Beecher, 7 YALE J.L. HUMAN. 1, 6-7 (1995). 
61 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193. 
62 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196. 
63 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195-96. 
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enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private 
and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices 
threaten to make good the prediction that “what is 
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
house-tops.”  For years there has been a feeling that 
the law must afford some remedy for the unauthorized 
circulation of portraits of private persons; and the evil 
of invasion of privacy by the newspapers, long keenly 
felt, has been but recently discussed by an able 
writer.64 
The able writer referred to here was E. L. Godkin, longtime 
editor of The Nation, whose essay, The Rights of the Citizen to His 
Own Reputation, was twice praised in The Right to Privacy.65  Like 
his contemporaries, Godkin condemned the mass circulation of 
personal information both because it undermined public discussion of 
broader issues and because it turned the mortification of individuals 
into profitable entertainment.66  Directly foreshadowing Brandeis’ 
and Warren’s complaint that the gossip industry deprived men of any 
escape from the pressures of modern society, Godkin recalled Coke’s 
dictum that “[a] man’s house is his castle” in order to show that the 
right to privacy had long been recognized as a fundamental principle 
of law.67 
And this recognition by law and custom of a man’s 
house as his tutissimum refugium, his place of repose, 
is but the outward and visible sign of the law’s respect 
for his personality as an individual, for . . . that inner 
world of personal thought and feeling in which every 
man . . . who is worth much to himself and others, 
passes a great deal of time.  The right to decide how 
much knowledge . . . of his own private doings and 
affairs, and of those of his family living under his roof, 
the public at large shall have, is as much one of his 
natural rights as . . . how he shall [decide to] eat and 
 
64 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. 
65 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 n.6, 217 n.4. 
66 E. L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen to His Own Reputation, 8 SCRIBNER’S 58, 66 
(1890). 
67 Id. at 65. 
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drink, what he shall wear, and . . . [how] he shall pass 
his leisure hours.68 
Godkin, Warren, and Brandeis all reached back into history to 
prove the venerable heritage of the right to privacy and all three 
stressed that the conditions of modern industrial society made it 
necessary to invent new protections for this ancient right.69  On the 
one hand, they argued, technological development had vastly 
increased the speed and scope of the circulation of personal 
information.70  On the other, the progress of civilization had 
deepened men’s delicacy of feeling, making them more susceptible to 
the pain of public scrutiny.  Indeed, according to Brandeis and 
Warren, the depth of emotional awareness in the modern age was so 
profound that men were apt to suffer more from insults to their honor 
than they would from physical violence.71  
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon 
advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some 
retreat from the world, and man, under the refining 
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to 
publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become 
more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise 
and invention have, through invasions upon his 
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far 
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.72 
From this standpoint, we can see how the development of the 
popular press, commercial and news photography, the telegraph, and, 
somewhat later, the telephone fueled what might be described as an 
epistemological shift in American law and society.  With the 
evolution of new modes of communication, men felt compelled to 
look to the law to control, not only what individuals could or could 
not do, but whether what they did would become generally known.73  
As illustrated in the elevation of public disgrace above bodily injury, 
command over public knowledge of a man’s domestic affairs became 
 
68 Id. 
69 See Godkin, supra note 66, at 8; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193-96.  
70 See Godkin, supra note 66, at 8; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.  
71 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198. 
72 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196. 
73 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. 
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an integral part of prevailing conceptions of middle and upper-class 
masculinity.74  As a result, in regard to marital infidelity, domestic 
violence, and sexual assault and misconduct, legal fictions that were 
designed to safeguard men’s emotional well-being overtook the lived 
experiences of women and children when these cases could not be 
kept out of court.75  For the most part, however, reporting on sexual 
crimes and misbehavior simply ended as publications such as New 
York Times, which remade itself as a so-called family newspaper in 
1896,76 excluded these matters from “All the News That’s Fit to 
Print,” the motto that still appears on its masthead today.77 
 Along these lines, Brandeis and Warren wrote approvingly of 
the action per quod servitium amisit, which, in cases of sexual 
molestation, equates harm done to dependent children with those 
inflicted on servants and allows parents to collect damages based on 
the loss of their children’s services.78  This equation was, Brandeis 
and Warren admitted, “[a] mean fiction,” but it answered the 
“demands of society” because it permitted “damages for injuries to 
the parents’ feelings”79 without actually specifying the nature of the 
crime.  Although it may seem that the inclusion of both parents in the 
main text implies that this loss of honor also pertained to mothers, the 
footnote to this passage makes it clear that Brandeis and Warren had 
in mind the way the rape of a daughter specifically and materially 
injures her father.80 
The note begins with the observation that the basis of this 
claim is not the injured child’s inability to contribute to the material 
welfare of her parents: “[l]oss of service is the gist of the action; but 
it has been said that ‘we are not aware of any reported case brought 
by a parent where the value of such services was held to be the 
 
74 Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy got its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441, 441-
42 (1991). 
75 Id. at 452-53. 
76 DE YONGH, NEW YORK TIMES. EASTER. THE MODEL OF DECENT AND DIGNIFIED 
JOURNALISM (photo. reprt. 2001) (1896), http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/93513098. 
77 Our History, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 8, 2016, 11:00 PM), http://www.nytco.com/who-we-
are/culture/our-history. 
78 Keller v. Donnelly, 5 Md. 211, 211-13, 216-19 (1853); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, 
at 194. 
79 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 194. 
80 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 194 n.5 (“[T]he feelings of the parent, the dishonor to 
himself and his family, were accepted as the most important element of damage.”)  
(emphasis added). 
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measure of damages.’ ”81  Brandeis and Warren then recounted how 
emotional harm to the father became the fulcrum of the claim: 
      First the fiction of constructive service was 
invented.  Then the feelings of the parent, the dishonor 
to himself and his family, were accepted as the most 
important element of damage.  The allowance of these 
damages would seem to be a recognition that the 
invasion upon the honor of the family is an injury to 
the parent’s person, for ordinarily mere injury to 
parental feelings is not an element of damage, e.g., the 
suffering of the parent in case of physical injury to the 
child.82 
The priority here given to men’s feelings over the physical 
harm done to their children, underscores the baleful legacy of The 
Right to Privacy.83  By maximizing the importance of men’s public 
image and minimizing the significance of bodily injury and actual 
fact, the essay helped to forge the gentlemen’s agreement that not 
only kept reports of sexual and domestic violence out of the press, 
but also served for decades to discourage victims of these crimes 
from speaking out.84  The deterrent to the wives and daughters, 
whose physical well-being and emotional security were mainly at 
issue in this context, was not simply that they had no legal identity 
apart from their husbands and fathers.85  It was also that coming 
forward would jeopardize the honor of the men who were duty-bound 
to protect them, a frightening prospect in a world in which reputation 
was regarded, in Godkin’s words, as “the most valuable thing on 
earth.”86 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The type of censorship that Brandeis and Warren advocated 
became far less routine in the wake of the women’s rights movement 
 
81 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 194 n.5.  
82 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 194 n.5 (citations omitted). 
83 Allen & Mack, supra note 74, at 458-59. 
84 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 194 n.5, 196-98.   
85 Godkin, supra note 66, at 58.   
86 Godkin, supra note 66, at 58.  
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of the 1970s.87  However, the legacy of The Right to Privacy remains 
problematic even if we jettison the archaic assumptions about male 
supremacy that pervade the essay.  In seeking to preserve men’s 
ability to control their public persona, Brandeis and Warren 
introduced an element of untrustworthiness that helped to reconfigure 
prevailing perceptions of the public/private divide.88  After all, when 
they followed Beecher’s example by trying to draw a curtain on 
men’s domestic affairs, they did not intend to make home and family 
invisible.89  Instead, Brandeis and Warren sought to enable men to 
seem to conform to conventional standards of decency, a goal that 
requires a comprehensive portrait of individuals in both their public 
and private lives.90  Because this approach to preserving reputation 
legitimizes some degree of dishonesty, it inevitably raises the issue of 
fixing the point at which omission becomes concealment or the 
manipulation of facts becomes a lie.91 
Although it may be impossible to settle this thorny issue, we 
can examine the assumptions behind it in order to highlight important 
aspects of the historical shift embodied in The Right to Privacy.  
When Brandeis and Warren suggested that certain types of personal 
information be withheld from publication, and recommended that 
men should be permitted to practice what might be described as 
personal public relations, they unwittingly upended the traditional 
priority of the public over the private realm.92  More specifically, by 
turning reputation from a set of facts into a managed impression, they 
raised the question of whether self-presentation might be nothing 
more than the façade that radicals such as Woodhull had vowed to 
destroy.93  
It is, consequently, not surprising that in the wake of The 
Right to Privacy, we have come to view public activities as mere 
performance, and to assume that the real truth can only be discovered 
 
87 See Jenny Kitzinger, Media Coverage of Sexual Violence Against Women, in WOMEN AND 
MEDIA: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 13-33 (2004) (providing an overview of the impact of 
the feminist movement in pushing the media to report on rape as a serious crime that 
deserves public attention). 
88 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 199-200. 
89 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193-96.  
90 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193-95.  
91 Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 164–65 (1999). 
92 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 58 (2d ed. 1998) (1958). 
93 Id.  
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 1, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/10
2017 PRIVACY AND CONFORMITY 175 
if we look behind the scenes.94  In previous eras, participation in 
public life was seen as the highest expression of humanity.95  In our 
time, in contrast, with the integration of communications 
technologies into every aspect of existence, we have embraced the 
idea that public figures only reveal their true selves off camera, in 
surreptitious recordings, or unplanned remarks.96  As public activities 
began to be viewed as scripted presentations, the private realm 
replaced the public sphere as the site of authenticity, the zone in 
which we expose who we really are.97  Given this testament to the 
continuing vitality of the cult of domesticity, we can see why The 
Right to Privacy failed to convince the public not to pry into private 
spaces.  Rather than deterring intrusion, Brandeis and Warren’s 
efforts to shut the door on public curiosity made us even more eager 




94 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196-99.  
95 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196-99. 
96 Justin Bennett, Media Overload: Restructuring the New York Times Rule in Order to 
Afford More Protection to Public Figures, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 21, 22, 31-32 (2006).  
97 Id. at 31-32.  
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